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is an excellent example of the kind of contribution that regionalists can make to the field of global
history. All of Citino’s case studies are global phenomena that had a regional expression. As I argued
elsewhere, during the 1950s and 1960s the U.S. supported modernization-promoting despots (I called
them “ISI-dictators”) not just in the Middle East but also in other areas of the Third World: Syngman
Rhee in Korea, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and Ramon Megsaysay in the Philippines.[19]  Likewise,
American efforts to promote land-reform were a uniform policy in the underdeveloped world. And as
Citino himself notes, America tried to create model-villages not just in Jordan but also in Vietnam
(with results that were far more catastrophic than they were in Jordan).
Another  heretic  thought  that  I  want  to  raise  concerns  Hammarskjold’s  proposal  for  regional
cooperation. Was it really a lost opportunity? Citino emphasizes Washington’s role in foiling this plan,
but  what  about  other  Arab countries?  Would  Saudi-Arabia  or  the  emirates  have  accepted that
scheme? Probably not. State logic maintains that their rulers would want to decide what to do with
their oil-profits rather than be committed to giving them away to a regional fund. Citino notes that
Hammarskjold, unlike McGhee, saw Egypt–and not Turkey–as the natural leader of the Middle East
and indeed, Nasser gave his blessing to Hammarskjold’s plan. That was no coincidence. Egyptian
diplomacy under Nasser tried to push through the Arab League exactly these kind of ideas for
regional cooperation. Thus, in 1961 Egypt tabled a proposal for a full economic union under an
Economic Unity Council. This blueprint never materialized because of disagreements between Arab
countries rather than Western intervention. Nasser realized that one way to circumvent this obstacle
was to undermine conservative Arab regimes and encourage the rise of like-minded movements in the
Arab world. Again, the reason that he was unsuccessful was not so much the Eisenhower Doctrine.
The endeavor was simply too ambitious and Egypt’s resources too meager. This too was a global
phenomenon. Other Afro-Asian countries that tried to lead the Third World, or at least the world
regions in which they were dominant,  were equally  unsuccessful.  Just  like the American policy
makers that Citino covers, leaders in China, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia tended to view poor
countries in too uniform terms and failed to see that the great disparities between them would make
it very hard to create a common platform.[20]
The last point I want to raise is the tendency to view the process of development as a cultural
construct rather than a material process. There is a lot of useful information about the networks of
knowledge and cooperation between American and Arab policymakers, recreated here by Citino’s
painstaking archival research. And there is also plenty of discussion about how these decision makers
imagined modernity and how they hoped to bring it about. However, I would have liked to know more
about the profit question: Were these American officials affiliated with corporations that stood to gain
from industrial growth in the Middle East? I would make the same argument with regard to speed as
a metaphor; a theme that is recurrent in the text. Speed, as Citino points out, was directly related to
the revolutionary appearance of air travel on a massive scale. However, air travel is also an industry
and I would have liked to know more about the economic transformation of the Middle East that
resulted directly from the introduction of air travel. This could have foregrounded a discussion about
why it took airports and airline companies so much time to respond to the new challenge posed by
international terrorism.
As any writer knows, there is only so much one can do in a given space, be it an article or a book.
There will always be people who would want the author to cover this or that topic in greater detail or
wonder why the book does not fully subscribe to their particular worldview. Even given my questions
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and criticism, it is clear that Nathan Citino has written a very valuable study, one that will be debated
by scholars of various disciplines and regional interests. I have benefited greatly from reading it and
want to thank the editors of H-Diplo for giving me the opportunity to review it.
 
Review by Nicole Sackley, University of Richmond
Writing Regionalism into the History of Modernization: A Review of Nathan Citino’s Envisioning the
Arab Future
In 1900, Methodist minister and Chautauqua movement leader Jess Lyman Hurlbut published a guide
to the Holy Land featuring “one hundred stereographed places in Palestine.” A proselytizer for
‘Biblical  history,’  Hurlbut  imagined  the  popular  nineteenth-century  technology  of  the  handheld
stereoscope to possess “magical…power to give us a vivid realization of the actuality of the Biblical
narrative.” Its illusion of three-dimensional depth through two juxtaposed photographs would enable
Americans at home to “stand…in the very presence of Palestine” and “think [themselves] into those
far-away  lands.”  Through  stereoscopes  and  accompanying  guides,  Hulbert  and  other  turn-of-t-
e-twentieth-century Western travelers attempted to construct a Near East fully knowable to Western
imperial eyes. Hulbert’s guide superimposed Orientalist tropes and apocryphal Biblical meaning onto
street  scenes in  contemporary  Jerusalem,  Damascus,  and Hebron. [21]  Yet  the stereoscope,  as  art
historian Jonathan Crary notes,  differed from still  photography in that “the disjunction between
experience and its cause…the composite, synthetic nature of the stereoscopic image could never be
fully effaced.”[22] By the 1920s, the stereoscope had lost out to photography and film as a techne of
seeing, in part because of its inability to hide the constructed-ness of its virtual reality.
It is precisely this constructed-ness—the awareness of overlap and difference between perspectives
set side-by-side—that Nathan J. Citino mines so brilliantly in his new history of modernization in U.S.-
Arab Relations between World War II and the 1967 Six-Day War. Envisioning the Arab Future offers a
history of postwar modernization in “stereoscope vision” that “considers how American development
strategies and the superpower rivalry combined with patterns in Arab history” (287, 10). It begins
with a critique of U.S. diplomatic historians for depicting development as an American ideology and
set of policies and practices gestated within the United States and exported to ‘the Third World’
during the Cold War. While highlighting U.S. power and intellectual assumptions, such an approach,
Citino argues, risks re-inscribing the “mental categories of the Cold War” by “portray[ing] developing
countries…as sharing underlying similarities based on their economic backwardness and relationship
to Cold War politics.”  To focus on the third world as an object  of  historical  analysis  misses a
“diversity and complexity” of different national and regional histories and perspectives (145, 179-
180). At the same time, Citino identifies regional lacunae in recent work by international historians
who focus on the transnational construction and circulation of development expertise. Like the U.S.
‘export’ narrative, such global histories bring into focus some important features of the history of
development, while blurring or effacing others.
Citino’s method is to introduce regionalism—in this case, the regional history of the Middle East—as
an “intermediate frame of reference” between the nation and the world.” (6) The method demands
H-Diplo    
Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Roundtable XIX, 13 on Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.-Arab Relations, 1945-1967.
H-Diplo. 11-27-2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/949894/h-diplo-roundtable-xix-13-envisioning-ara-
-future-modernization-us
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
14
wide and deep reading in multiple historiographies and archives. Envisioning the Arab Future draws
on Arab-language sources, from newspapers to memoirs, and research in eighteen archives from
Egypt and Lebanon to the United States and Great Britain. Attuned to the latest U.S. scholarship,
Citino nonetheless privileges themes in Middle Eastern historiography. The book is organized around
seven chapters that explore the cultural meanings of speed and travel, the legacies of Ottoman
history,  intra-regional  ideological  and  political  rivalries,  and  the  challenge  of  Islamism  and
Palestinian revolutionaries to Arab socialist and secular nationalist regimes. The chapters overlap
temporally, but they all further Citino’s larger argument. That is, from the late 1940s through the
mid-1960s, Arab and American elites shared assumptions and practices with which they imagined
and competed over the future of the Middle East. Those assumptions and practices broke down in a
“crisis of modernization” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (253)
Other reviewers in this roundtable will no doubt address the contributions Citino makes to the history
of the twentieth-century Middle East.  My aim in what follows is to highlight what Citino offers
historians of international development. In Citino’s hands, stereoscopic vision becomes a mechanism
for decolonizing histories of development. Envisioning the Arab Future demonstrates how to place
U.S. and third-world actors in the same frame and explore both the shared and differing contexts and
political  assumptions  they  brought  to  their  encounters.  It  explores  development  as  a  political
vernacular deployed not only in superpower rivalries but intra-regional struggles. It recovers the role
of history—both imperial legacies and narratives about the past—in the construction of modernization
theory. It reminds diplomatic and development historians of the analytical power of cultural analysis,
and it challenges both the timing of, and cultural essentialism with which, many scholars place
Islamism in histories of U.S.-Arab relations.
Like most histories of development, Envisioning the Arab Future is a history of elites, but one that
casts a much wider net to reveal a diverse range of American and Arab modernizers. Along with
Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and U.S. President John
F. Kennedy, Citino peoples his history with Arab diplomats like Khalid al-‘Azm (known as the Red
Pasha), Communists Salah Madhi Daklah and Nabih Rushaydat, and intellectuals and development
project leaders like Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy and Lebanese rural sociologist Afif Tannous.
British orientalists,  Iraqi  military officers,  American oil  executives,  lawyers,  and geologists,  and
Palestinian fida’iyin also figure prominently. Citino even includes Islamists, notably the Egyptian
writer Sayyid Qutb, in his pantheon of postwar modernizers.
These Arab and American elites  shared experiences and assumptions about the mechanisms of
modernization, even as they contended over the purpose of social transformation. Citino dispels
notions of Arab isolation by emphasizing the importance of global travel in shaping Arab worldviews.
Drawing on the work of Ussama Makdisi, Cemil Aydin, On Barak, and others, Citino emphasizes the
long history of interchange between Americans and Arabs and between Arab elites and the world,
from American missionary projects (American University in Beirut was founded in 1866) to Arab
travel to Europe, the United States, and Asia.[23]  This traffic accelerated after 1945, as new U.S.
programs like  Fulbright  student  exchanges  and private  enterprises  such as  Arab American Oil
Company (ARAMCO), brought thousands of members of the Arab elite to tour or study in the United
States.  Arabs and Americans also both participated in emerging global  circuits  of  development
expertise.  Citino is particularly impressive in documenting how Arab experts both drew on and
contributed to these global networks, from Bandung to Calcutta, from California’s imperial valley to
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West Africa.  Arab modernizers also traveled to Poland and the Soviet Union, followed the careers of
Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Congo Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and hosted delegations from
China and North Vietnam. Indeed, Citino’s account implies that, through non-aligned conferences and
visits to the ‘Second World’ of Eastern Europe, Arab modernizers could more fully claim the label
‘cosmopolitan’ than their American counterparts.
Citino depicts American and Arab modernizers as sharing a firm faith in the power of a secular elite
to engineer social and economic transformation through large-scale development projects. Citino
offers, as the paradigmatic example of this shared faith, the friendship of Nasser and the prominent
U.S. Arabist William Roe Polk. Nasser and Polk were champions of accelerating economic growth
through state-led industrialization, population control, military leadership, and the forging of what
Polk termed ‘new men’ from the furnace of the Egyptian army and planned rural communities. A
powerful paternalism—that frequently shaded into disdain for both peasants and an Arab periphery
described pejoratively as mutakhallif  or “retarded, backward, underdeveloped”—undergirded this
vision.  (26)  Both  Nasser  and  Polk  viewed  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  as  a  fading  remnant  of  a
‘traditional’ Arab past. And Nasser, who justified Egypt’s military intervention into Yemen as enabling
Yemen to break “’the shackles of under-development,’” was particularly taken by Walt Rostow’s
Stages of Economic Growth (236, 246).[24] 
Rostow’s theory of historical economic stages and its famous metaphor of economic ‘take-off’ holds a
central place in Citino’s history of Arab visions of modernization. Citino argues that the intellectual
assumptions that undergirded Rostow’s iconic text—about “the interdependence of social, economic,
and political change” and the ability to uncover and forge a unilinear path to the future—defined not
only U.S. modernization theory but also Arab thought and politics in the years after World War II (18,
54). Citino makes the case that, like Rostow and other American modernizers, Arab elites spoke the
language of social  ‘systems’ and imagined modernization as “linear,  structural” change wherein
transformation in one realm of society had cascading affects throughout “the system.” (45) Moreover,
where other historians have connected secular nationalist leaders with American modernizers, Citino
reads Arab sources to make the case that, in the postwar Middle East at least, systems thinking
extended also to those who rejected secularism. Egypt’s Sayiid Qutb, for example, re-formulated
Islam as a “system [nizam] superior to either of the superpowers’ materialistic prescriptions.” (39)
Where Walt Rostow posited a trajectory from “The Traditional Society” to “the Age of High Mass
Consumption,” Qutb constructed Islamism that rejected consumption as the measure of modernity.[25]
Here Citino builds on work in Middle Eastern historiography to complicate the binary of tradition and
“modernity”  to  understand  development  thinking.  Instead  of  accepting  Nasser’s  judgment  of
Islamism as backward-looking, Citino demonstrates how Islamists, like their secular counterparts,
“appropriated the language of postwar modernization” to envision a postwar Arab future different
than its past. (288)
If systems thinking could unite a diverse array of elites, it could never bridge intractable divisions
about the political aims of modernization. One of Citino’s key insights is showing how, in the Middle
East in the 1950s and 1960s, development functioned as a discourse and set of practices with which
to fight political battles and shore up political legitimacy. Contentions over the aims of modernization
could pit U.S. foreign policymakers against Arab leaders, but development could also provide an
arena  for  intra-regional  rivalries.  “[D]ifferent  contemporary  agendas  could  attach  to  the  same
development project” (146). Citino offers the East Ghor canal project to resettle Palestinian refugees
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expelled from Israel on newly irrigated land in Jordan as a case in point. Where the Eisenhower
administration understood the project as “a public symbol of Jordan’s pro-Western orientation and
willingness to deescalate the conflict with Israel,” Jordan’s King Husayn viewed East Ghor to as
means to challenge Nasser for leadership of the Arab Middle East by “promoting Jordan as Israel’s
leading Arab rival when it came to ‘making the desert bloom’” (164-165). The Kennedy administration
failed to see how the Qasim regime in Iraq used connections to the socialist world to promote Iraqi
state  patriotism  or  pan-Arab  nationalism;  the  Johnson  administration  grew  frustrated  when
development projects failed to turn Nasser’s “energies inward” away from the conflict with Israel
(227). The stubborn myopia of U.S. policymakers—who, wearing Cold War lenses, were blind to the
local,  political  agendas  that  Arab  modernizers  had  for  development—is  a  running  theme  of
Envisioning the Arab Future.
Yet, as Citino shows, both American and Arab modernizers understood development as a political
project and an opportunity to shore up political legitimacy. In a deeply-researched chapter, Citino
traces the trajectories of four community projects in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to explicate how
elite “planners sought validation by appearing to take the wishes of locals into account and by
demonstrating respect for their ways of life.” (99) From ARAMCO’s suburban “American Camp” in
the Arabian desert to the Egyptian Tahir Province agricultural settlement:
…local knowledge about human and natural environments took on political value. Far from
ignoring local knowledge, planners compiled, scrutinized, and brandished it as a defense
against charges of paternalism (99).
Here, Citino enters into an historiographic debate about the nature of elite power in development
practice.  Challenging historian James C.  Scott’s  widely-cited  depiction  of  state-led  development
projects as “authoritarian high modernism,” Citino argues that American and Arab modernizers were
acutely aware of the political context of their schemes.[26] ARAMCO established an office to “collect
and manage local knowledge” and how advocates and detractors of the Tahir settlement argued over
its ability to “respect peasants’  ways of  life” (122-123).  Concern for popular acceptance, Citino
writes, led modernizers to attempt to “distinguish…their own, locally focused efforts from what they
portrayed  as  the  malign  influence  of  distant  and  impersonal  bureaucracies”  (101).  In  Citino’s
depiction,  development projects  involved not  only  state power and violence,  but  also efforts  at
cultural legitimation. Such efforts at legitimation were more for the benefit of donors (such as the
Ford Foundation) and political support from the urban middle class than for the poor, who were the
objects of such schemes.
Citino concludes that model village projects had little support from the poor themselves. In the
political debates over development, subaltern voices come through, Citino suggests, through acts of
resistance, such as the attack on the U.S.-backed Arab Development Society by Palestinian refugees
chanting anti-American slogans in 1955 and the attacks against ARAMCO’s American camp during
the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. This reader wondered whether such actions were, in fact, less symbolic
attacks against these sites of planned modernization than against U.S. imperialism more broadly. But
Citino’s efforts to include them are important, nonetheless. They demonstrate the imperative, in the
face of limited archival sources, of writing the poor back into histories of development.
One of the larger aims of Envisioning the Future is to return history to the history of development.
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The history of the Middle East operates in two registers in this book. First, Citino uses his wide-
ranging  knowledge  of  nineteenth-  and  early-twentieth-century  Ottoman  and  European  imperial
history to examine the particular regional contexts that shaped modernization efforts in the Middle
East after 1945. Second, he documents the shared fascination of American and Arab modernizers
with history as a mechanism for political legitimation and as a guide for the future. Arab elites drew
on examples from U.S. history to, in Nasser’s words, “‘compensate for the past and catch up to the
future’” (2). In land reform debates, for example, Egyptian Free Officer Sayed Marai invoked U.S.
President Thomas Jefferson’s agrarian vision; Murai’s opponent Magdi Hasanayn countered with
references to industrial farming in California’s Durham colony; another Syrian alluded to the “’the
wild west of America in Gold Rush days.’” (144-145)
The traffic in historical precedents moved in both directions. While Arab elites drew selectively from
U.S. history to advance local agendas, U.S. social scientists, policymakers, and corporate leaders
consumed and repackaged the Middle Eastern past to suit Cold War goals. Challenging standard
scholarly interpretations of modernization theory as a mix of American liberalism and Parsonian
social science, Citino demonstrates the significant role politicized narratives about Ottoman and
Egyptian history had in shaping core postwar ideas and assumptions about modernization. Citino
depicts how exchanges between American and Arab intellectuals fed U.S. visions of the military as a
modernizing  social  force,  the  Arab  periphery  as  backward,  and  of  Ottoman  land  reform  as
destructive. He identifies British Orientalist H.A.R. Gibb, the political scientist Dankwart Rustow,
Arabist  William Polk,  and Lebanese-American sociologist  Afif  Tannous as  critical  importers  and
translators. Through Arab regional experience and studies with Turkish, Lebanese, and Egyptian
scholars,  Gibb,  Rustow,  Polk,  and  Tannous  brought  these  narratives  to  central  sites  for  the
construction of modernization theory and U.S. policy, notably the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),
Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the University of Chicago’s Adlai Stevenson
Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA), and the U.S. Department of State. Citino’s close attention to
individual biography and intellectual genealogy reveals the imprint of narratives of Ottoman imperial
decline and Kemalist rebirth on such central texts of modernization theory as Daniel Lerner’s Passing
of Traditional Society and Rustow’s Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey.[27] Citino’s research
thus joins other recent historical scholarship on community development and cultural anthropology to
depict more diverse roots and branches for social scientific theories of modernization.[28] At the same
time,  Citino  does  not  lose  sight  of  asymmetries  of  power.  It  was  American  policymakers  and
corporate  leaders  who  selected  and  amplified  (through  platforms  like  CFR  and  ASIIA)  those
narratives that bolstered their own political and economic agendas in the Middle East, and then
rearranged “historical materials…like the bricoleur” as political circumstances changed (95). In the
case of Turkey, social scientists re-envisioned Atatürk from “the father of the Turkish example to a
generic military modernizer” as U.S.-Turkish relations deteriorated over the course of the 1960s (93).
Throughout, Citino brings our attention to such examples of modernizers re-scripting the past—both
the distant imperial one and their own personal careers as modernizers—to serve their political
agendas.  The intellectual  work of  writing the history of  development,  Citino suggests,  requires
peeling back the layers of “development mythology” (103).
Adept at diplomatic and intellectual history, Citino is also a keen and creative reader of culture.
Other historians, notably Christina Klein, Melani McAlister, and Andrew Rotter, have explored the
cultural representations of Asia and the Middle East in the postwar American imagination, but the
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cultural  history  of  development  and  modernization  remains  largely  unwritten. [29]  Where  Klein,
McAlister, and Rotter focus on U.S. sources, Citino applies his stereoscopic method to culture by
examining how Americans and Arabs found cultural and political meaning in travel, domesticity,
speed, and revolution. Citino reads political cartoons, memoirs, court transcripts, and photographs in
attempt to show how “American and Arab perceptions of one another [were] mutually constitutive”
(9). Gender is an important category of analysis for Citino: He illuminates how ideologies of separate
spheres supported American and Arab modernizers’ claims to respect “tradition”; how the Arab
Development Society and a new generation of fida’iyin offered up competing visions of Palestinian
masculinity; and how “gestures of masculine camaraderie” cemented relationships between American
and Egyptian elites (241). But it is Citino’s examination of the airplane as a metaphor for the rise and
decline postwar modernization that is perhaps his most exciting and innovative re-interpretation of
the history of U.S.-Arab relations. Bringing together readings of Arab sources with scholarship by
Yoav  Di-Capua,  Jennifer  Van  Vleck,  and  other  cultural  historians  of  aviation,  Citino  makes  a
compelling case that for “Arabs and Americans alike, fascination with the cutting-edge technologies
of speed influenced the dominant descriptions of societal progress” (54).[30] He shows how Rostow’s
famous metaphor of economic ‘take off’ was more than a useful visual analogy; it tapped into cultural
connections that associated speed—and particularly the jet airplane—with progress and expertise.
The image of  take-off,  Citino argues,  “functioned as a self-evident argument for elite authority,
because technical skill was essential to managing a complex system through a dangerous process of
transition” (255).  It  was precisely  this  symbolic  power and claim to legitimacy that  Palestinian
fida’iyin consciously sought to attack through a series of international airline hijackings after 1967.
Egypt’s and Syria’s humiliating defeat in the war against Israel—in which they lost most of their
combined air force—“eliminated any political value that aerospace may have held for Egypt and other
Arab countries as a modern symbol of state authority” (265). The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine  capitalized  on  this  political  crisis  by  reversing  Rostow’s  metaphor,  to  highlight  U.S.
underdevelopment of the Middle East and Arab leaders’ complicity in it. The Front understood their
guerilla  tactics  as  symbolically  meaningful  attacks  on  American  and  Arab  elites’  systems  of
technocratic oppression.
In a volume filled with impressive research and rich with new interpretations, there is little with
which to contend. I do have, however, two questions for Citino. The first is about methodology. Citino
makes the case that Americans and Arabs shared a romance, and then subsequent disillusionment,
with the image of society as a system. In the first chapter, he uses the appearance of the term
‘system’ in writings of Islamists like Qutb and U.S. social scientists like Daniel Lerner as evidence for
a shared thinking in systems (46). In the final chapter, he draws parallels between African-American
and student radicals in the United States and fida’iyin and Islamists in the Middle East to depict a
shared “crisis of modernization” in the late 1960s. In both parts of the world, protestors condemned
‘the system,’ decried state power, and talked a new language of liberation. Each was part of a “more
comprehensive break with postwar structuralism” that [Daniel] Rodgers describes as the ‘age of
fracture’ in the United States and that [Elizabeth] Kassab labels the second Nahda in Arab thought”[31]
(274).  While  appreciating Citino’s  wide reading of  both U.S.  and Middle  Eastern histories,  the
connections here seem to me to rely too much on comparison. Citino’s interpretation here would have
been stronger with more evidence of political and intellectual exchange across national borders. On
what routes did these ideas circulate? There is some evidence of African-American consumption of
Palestinian nationalism. But how did fida’iyin and Islamists ingest the global politics of 1968?
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My second question revolves around the place of Israel in Citino’s account of the postwar Middle
East. One of the aims of Envisioning the Arab Future is to “broaden the discussion of postwar Arab
history  beyond  anti-Zionism”  and  to  demonstrate  that  “U.S.  relations  with  the  Arab  world
encompassed more than just battles over Israel” (289, 5). Citino is right that the centrality of the
Arab-Israeli conflict in U.S. diplomatic histories has obscured other important connections between
the United States and the Middle East. Yet, in sidelining the state of Israel and the longer history of
Zionist  activity  in  Palestine,  Citino  misses  an  opportunity  to  investigate  what  role  Zionist
developmentalism played in this story. Did the interwar Zionist ideas and projects, that Jacob Norris
traces in Land of Progress, filter into Arab modernizers visions of development?[32] How did American images of the
Israeli kibbutz and popular narratives about Israel as the ‘land of milk and honey’ shape how U.S. policymakers approached Arab development projects? My goal here is not to re-center
Israel in this history, but a full history of postwar modernization in the Middle East would seem to need to wrestle in some way with both Israeli actors and perceptions of Israel. But
that would also require more research, adding to an already full account.
Ultimately, neither of these critiques amount to more than quibbles. More than a regional case study,
Envisioning  the  Arab  Future  is  an  important  and  exciting  reinterpretation  of  the  history  of
modernization  and  postwar  international  development.  It  both  enhances  and  undermines  the
stereoscopes in our histories.
 
